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PROBLEMS IN RESIDENTIAL TENANCY 
LAW REVEALED BY HOLLER V OSAKI 
Mark Bennett 
This article argues that the recent series of judgments in the Holler v Osaki litigation reveals 
concerning features of our residential tenancy law contained in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 
and its application by the Tenancy Tribunal and the courts. The law relating to residential tenancies 
is important: it regulates both tenants' ability to access the basic need of shelter and to satisfy their 
desire for home, and the financial investments of landlords. It is meant to allow landlords and tenants 
to understand their rights and obligations so that they may apply the law to their situations without 
legal assistance. However, Holler v Osaki illustrates the vagueness and therefore uncertainty 
concerning key legal rules within the Act, which led to the pre-existing understanding of the law being 
upended and the paralysis of the Tenancy Tribunal's ability to deal with careless damage. This article 
also highlights inconsistencies in the decisions of Tenancy Tribunal adjudicators, who applied 
completely different interpretations of the law to substantially identical facts.   
I INTRODUCTION  
In 2009, Mrs Osaki allowed a pot of oil to boil over while cooking, having been distracted by her 
children. This caused a fire that damaged her home – a house that her husband, Mr Osaki, rented from 
Holler and Rouse. The damage was repaired at a cost of over $216,000 – which was met by the 
appellant's insurer, AMI Insurance (AMI). AMI exercised its right to bring a subrogated recovery 
action against the Osakis in the names of Holler and Rouse,1 claiming the cost of repair.2 But what 
might seem a straightforward case of the Osakis' liability for negligent damage turned out to be a case 
that culminated in a decision of the Court of Appeal upturning the pre-existing understanding of the 
  
  Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. I thank the anonymous reviewers, Bill 
Atkin, Thomas Gibbons, Bridgette Toy-Cronin and my colleagues at Victoria University who attended a staff 
seminar on this topic for their comments. I also thank the editors for their comments and corrections. 
1  See generally Sheehan v Watson [2010] NZCA 454, [2011] 1 NZLR 314; and Paul Michalik and Christopher 
Boys Insurance Claims in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at ch 12.  
2  Holler v Osaki [2014] NZHC 1977, [2014] 3 NZLR 791 [Holler v Osaki (HC)] at [2]. 
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law, thereby removing the Tenancy Tribunal's ability to hold tenants liable for their negligent damage 
to their landlord's property in many cases.3  
Although it seldom reaches such heights of our appellate hierarchy, residential tenancy law is 
important. It regulates both the tenant's ability to access the basic need of shelter and to satisfy their 
desire for home, and the landlord's control over their financial investments. In many cases, more 
access for the tenant means less control for the landlord, so some "balance" needs to be struck. As in 
many jurisdictions, in New Zealand this balance is set out in statutory residential tenancy law, with 
the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) containing most of the law of residential tenancies. The 
recent series of judgments in the case of Holler v Osaki reveals some concerning features of our 
residential tenancy law that have caused problems in its application by the Tenancy Tribunal and the 
courts. As David Grinlinton observes, it has "altered the delicate balance in the landlord/tenant 
relationship and specifically the ability of landlords to enforce basic obligations of tenants to take care 
of premises".4 This article examines how the Holler v Osaki decisions caused this change, but it does 
not discuss the policy issues relating to exoneration and the practical problems that the decision has 
caused – which have been comprehensively analysed by Grinlinton in two recent articles,5 and which 
were discussed at the time of the decisions by other commentators.6 Instead, it focuses on two other 
notable features of the litigation that reveal problems in our residential tenancy law. 
First, it identifies the interaction of the RTA with the Property Law Act 2007 (PLA) through s 
142 of the RTA as another example of the lack of clarity in our law of residential tenancies7 – one 
  
3  Holler v Osaki [2016] NZCA 130, [2016] 2 NZLR 811 [Holler v Osaki (CA)]. 
4  David Grinlinton "The boundaries between residential tenancies and commercial leases" [2017] NZLJ 4 at 7. 
5  Grinlinton, above n 4; and David Grinlinton "Tenant Liability for Negligent Damage Following Holler v 
Osaki" (2017) 27 NZULR 626. 
6  See Adam de Hamel "A prophetic case – the liability of tenants under the Residential Tenancies Act 1986" 
[2016] NZLJ 250; Thomas Gibbons "Holler v Osaki" (2016) 17 BCB 307; Thomas Gibbons "Holler v Osaki" 
(2015) 16 BCB 132; and Thomas Gibbons "Case Note: Holler v Osaki" (2014) 22 Wai L Rev 183. The 
practical problems are also set out in a letter from Melissa Poole (Principal Tenancy Adjudicator) to Nick 
Smith (Minister of Building and Housing) regarding Holler v Osaki (CA), above n 3, (23 September 2016). 
See also Po Tsai "Holler v Osaki: The Careless Tenant Exonerated" (LLB (Hons) research paper, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2017).  
7  See also the lack of clarity that surrounds the requirement that houses subject to a residential tenancy must be 
free from dampness: see Sarah Bierre, Mark Bennett and Philippa Howden-Chapman "Decent Expectations? 
The Use and Interpretation of Housing Standards in Tenancy Tribunals in New Zealand" (2014) 26 NZULR 
153. Other interpretive problems include the role of the s 85 discretion in the RTA to decide cases according 
to their merits and justice discussed in Part IV(C), and the question of illegal tenancies under ss 2 and 137 of 
the RTA, as interpreted by Anderson v FM Custodians [2014] NZHC 382 and then applied (or distinguished) 
in the Tenancy Tribunal in orders such as Tan v Arzi TT Manukau 4024444, 7 November 2016; Pihama v 
Yinwen TT Lower Hutt 4045048, 14 December 2016; Smith v Arzi TT Manukau 4049853, 31 July 2017; and 
Sneddon v Paddi & Co Ltd TT Palmerston North 4104107, 16 November 2017. 
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which the courts found difficult to understand, and which the courts in Holler v Osaki interpreted as 
having a meaning completely contrary to the prior understanding of the law. The new interpretation 
upends settled Tribunal practice, for in the many years since the relevant provision was enacted 
tenants have been ordered to pay compensation for damage for their careless acts. According to new 
interpretation, from 2007 tenants should have been exonerated from liability for careless damage 
where their landlord was insured.  
Second, and perhaps of more concern, when the new interpretation of the law was stated by the 
District and High Courts, it was not always applied to residential tenancy disputes where it was 
relevant. The Tenancy Tribunal did not uniformly apply the exoneration provisions until two years 
later, when the Court of Appeal confirmed the lower courts' interpretation. This is demonstrated by 
examining over 100 Tribunal orders from the date of the District Court decision onwards. This deep 
analysis of Tribunal practice has been enabled by the relatively recent keyword search functionality 
on the Ministry of Justice's database of Tribunal orders, and it provides important insights into the 
way that Tribunal adjudicators addressed the fundamental change to tenant liability caused by Holler 
v Osaki.  
This article has four main parts. Part II sets out the key legal question in Holler v Osaki, and then 
Part III analyses how the Tribunal and courts interpreted the law. The article then examines the 
problems identified above: Part IV criticises the vague provisions in our law of residential tenancies, 
and then Part V discusses the problems in the Tenancy Tribunal's application of the law.  
II THE EXONERATION OF TENANTS' LIABILITY FOR 
DAMAGE 
A The Basic Legal Question 
The one important legal question in Holler v Osaki is a difficult issue of statutory interpretation 
concerning the relationship between the RTA and provisions of the PLA that exonerate tenants from 
their liability for damage to the property they are renting. Section 268 of the PLA identifies the 
circumstances where the provisions apply, namely where leased premises are destroyed or damaged 
by "fire, flood, explosion, lightning, storm, earthquake, or volcanic activity" or by "the occurrence of 
any other peril against the risk of which the lessor is insured". In these circumstances s 269 of the 
PLA applies to exonerate the tenant from liability – even if the lessee's negligence caused or 
contributed to the event that caused the damage. Section 269 provides that the lessor must not require 
the lessee to meet the cost of "making good" the damage, or indemnify the lessor for doing so, or pay 
damages to remedy the loss. Indeed, if the lessee is contractually obliged to make good the loss, the 
lessor must indemnify the lessee.8 However, s 269(3) limits this exoneration of the lessee to situations 
where they have not damaged the property intentionally, or by an act or omission in the premises that 
  
8  Property Law Act 2007, s 269(2). 
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constitutes an imprisonable offence, or if their act or omission has made insurance moneys 
irrecoverable.   
If these exoneration provisions apply to residential tenancies, they would exonerate the Osakis' 
liability, because the damage was caused by a fire and the exceptions in s 269 do not apply.9 But the 
difficult question is whether the exoneration provisions apply to residential tenancies at all. Although 
under s 8(1) the PLA applies to land and other property in New Zealand, s 8(4) provides that, if any 
of its provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of another enactment, the other enactment 
prevails. Although the RTA does not contain any reference to the exoneration of liability, it does make 
tenants liable for damage they cause to the property,10 for which the Tribunal may award 
compensation.11 Furthermore, s 142 of the RTA "regulates" the application of the PLA to tenancies 
to which the RTA applies: 
142 Effect of Property Law Act 2007 
(1)  Nothing in Part 4 of the Property Law Act 2007 applies to a tenancy to which this Act applies.  
(2)  However, the Tribunal, in exercising its jurisdiction in accordance with section 85 of this Act, may 
look to Part 4 of the Property Law Act 2007 as a source of the general principles of law relating to 
a matter provided for in that Part (which relates to leases of land). 
This provision has been described as "awkwardly expressed"12 and as "paradoxical, if not starkly 
contradictory".13 It is not obvious how the s 142(1) direction that nothing in pt 4 of the PLA applies 
to residential tenancies (the "exclusion provision") is consistent with the s 142(2) discretion that the 
Tribunal "may look to" that Part as a source of general principles of leases (the "general principles 
discretion").  
Against this statutory background, the basic line of argument of each side is obvious: the lessors 
will say that the exoneration provisions (ss 268 and 269 of the PLA) do not apply to residential 
tenancies because of the exclusion provision (s 142(1) of the RTA), whereas the lessees will argue 
that those provisions contain general principles of the law of leases that are applicable under the 
general principle discretion (s 142(2) of the RTA). Everything should therefore turn on how the 
concept of the PLA being looked to as a "source of general principles" is understood.  
  
9  It was held in the District Court and High Court that Mrs Osaki would also be protected from liability despite 
not being the lessee or agent of the lessee: Holler v Osaki (HC), above n 2, at [51].  
10  Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 40(2)(a). 
11  Sections 77(2)(n) and 78(1)(d). 
12  Holler v Osaki (HC), above n 2, at [29]. 
13  Osaki v Holler TT Auckland 12/02284/AK, 23 October 2012 [Osaki v Holler (TT)] at [51].  
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B Why does this Legal Question Exist?  
This legal question exists due to the complicated legislative and policy history of the provisions.14 
There are two aspects to this point: the reason that the exoneration provisions apply only to 
commercial leases, and the reasons for creating the general principles discretion in s 142(2). The latter 
will be addressed in the following part.  
The reason that the PLA provisions exonerating commercial tenants from liability for careless 
damage exist at all is that Parliament accepted the suggestion of the Law Commission in its work, 
conducted in the first half of the 1990s, on proposals for a new Property Law Act.15 The Law 
Commission considered that, where a property is damaged by the negligence of a lessee or their 
licensee and that property is insured by the lessor, the lessee should be immune from liability.16 As 
summarised by Keane J in the High Court, the policy reasoning was that:17 
… the lessor could be anticipated to have insured the property, and to have imposed on the lessee all or 
most of the cost, either specifically or as an element of the rent. Yet in many cases, the lessee was 
uninsured and often assumed that the lessor's insurance would protect them.  
The Law Commission's report therefore proposed that the lessee should be exonerated from liability 
by default.18  
Yet when the PLA was enacted in 2007, the exoneration provisions were not expressly made 
applicable to residential tenancies, and the exclusion provision of the RTA seemed to exclude their 
operation.19 The Tenancy Tribunal continued to award compensation for careless damage by tenants, 
in the belief that the exoneration provisions did not apply to residential tenancies.20  
Indeed, because it was thought that the exoneration provisions did not apply to residential 
tenancies, there was pressure to alter this position. Tenants' liability for their negligent actions had 
earlier been dramatically illustrated by a 2002 District Court decision in which a landlord's insurer 
  
14  Grinlinton, above n 5, at 628–634. See also Tsai, above n 6, at 19–26.  
15  Grinlinton, above n 5, at 632–633. 
16  Law Commission A New Property Law Act (NZLC R29, 1994). See also Holler v Osaki (HC), above n 2, at 
[14]–[15]. 
17  At [14]. 
18  At [15].  
19  Grinlinton, above n 5, at 634–635. 
20  See David Grinlinton Residential Tenancies: The Law and Practice (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2012) 
at 144–145. 
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was awarded $80,000 against the tenants.21 The Judge made strident obiter comments on the injustice 
of the result, echoing the Law Commission's perspective:22 
The outcome of this proceeding, though in accordance with the law, is unjust. It is unlikely that the 
defendants were ever aware that their landlord (or the landlord's insurer acting by right of subrogation) 
might sue them for major damage to their flat, even if caused by the carelessness of one of them. I have 
no doubt that, while most residential tenants assume (almost invariably correctly) that their landlords 
insure and will be indemnified against damage to, or the destruction of, the insured property, they have 
little or no understanding of the insurer's right of subrogation. They assume that if a landlord is insured, 
they, the tenants, are not at risk. Few tenants insure against their potential liability to their landlord. Some 
do so incidentally to insuring their own possessions. The consequence is that, in the event of serious loss 
or damage to the leased property, the tenants (including flatmates not at fault) find themselves 
unexpectedly liable to the insurer, acting in the name of the landlord, for losses that may bankrupt them. 
… the entry of judgment against tenants is usually unjust because insurance premiums are factored into 
landlords' costs when fixing rents and they are effectively paid by the tenants. I note also that insurers 
accept the risk of leased residential properties knowing that the tenants are unlikely to have liability 
insurance or other means to pay claims and that the recovery of substantial contribution to the insured loss 
from tenants must be relatively uncommon. 
Due to this and other cases, there were further legislative proposals to extend the immunity to 
residential tenants in 2008,23 but these failed and such provisions were not included in the major 
amendments to the RTA passed in 2010.24  
III THE HOLLER V OSAKI DECISIONS 
This short survey of the development of the law explains the surprise that was felt by residential 
landlords when the courts held in Holler v Osaki that in fact the exoneration provisions do apply to 
residential tenancies. The following part only briefly describes the reasoning in the key decisions, 
because they have been discussed exhaustively elsewhere.25  
A Tenancy Tribunal  
When the case reached the Tenancy Tribunal (after a High Court decision had established the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction),26 it held that the exoneration provisions were not applicable to residential 
  
21  Harrison v Shields DC Dunedin NP435/00, 25 September 2002. 
22  At [42]–[43].  
23  Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008 (258-1), cl 26.  
24  Residential Tenancies Amendment Act 2010. 
25  In particular see Grinlinton, above n 4; Grinlinton, above n 5; and Tsai, above n 6. 
26  Holler v Osaki [2012] NZHC 939 [Holler v Osaki (summary judgment)]. 
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tenancies, essentially because the exoneration provisions had not been expressly made applicable to 
residential tenancies by Parliament and because they would be inconsistent with the RTA's damage 
provisions.27 Arguments based on the justice of the case could not be used where the substance of the 
law relating to liability for damage was against the defendant,28 and the s 142(2) argument that the 
exoneration provisions contained general principles of the law of leases could not be sustained in light 
of the RTA's clear statements of tenant liability for damage in ss 40–41.29 
B District Court 
In contrast, in the District Court Judge Mathers held that the exoneration provisions do apply to 
residential tenancies. The basic reason was that because s 85(2) of the RTA directed the Tenancy 
Tribunal to resolve disputes according to the general principles of the law relating to the matter and 
the substantial merits and justice of the case, and that "it would be very unfair if a well-resourced 
commercial tenant and its employees were exonerated, but a residential tenant not".30 The Judge 
applied the exoneration provisions as the legal rules that allowed justice to be done between the 
parties.31  
C High Court 
When the question of exoneration reached the High Court, Justice Keane identified a key 
interpretive question as the relationship between the two subsections of s 142 – the exclusion provision 
and the general principles discretion.32 The Judge identified four attributes of the RTA which s 142 
had to be understood in relation to: its purpose of setting out tenant and landlord rights and allowing 
disputes to be resolved efficiently; its applicability only to residential tenancies and not similar living 
arrangements that are expressly excluded33 ("the rights and duties of analogously placed tenants, and 
their liabilities and immunities, ought not to differ radically or inexplicably");34 and the direction in s 
85 to decide according to the substantial merits of a dispute.35 
  
27  Osaki v Holler (TT), above n 13, at [80]–[87]. 
28  At [65] and [81]. 
29  At [64] and [81]. 
30  Osaki v Holler DC Auckland CIV-2012-004-002306, 23 September 2013 [Osaki v Holler (DC)] at [49] and 
[55]–[58]. 
31  At [56]–[57].  
32  Holler v Osaki (HC), above n 2, at [30]. 
33  See Residential Tenancies Act, s 5. 
34  Holler v Osaki (HC), above n 2, at [37]. 
35  At [36]–[40]. 
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But seemingly the most important of the four attributes Keane J identified was his categorisation 
of the ways in which the RTA refers to other legislation. He identified s 142 as a provision that 
identifies the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,36 rather than as a restriction on the statutory matrix that the 
Tribunal or other courts must apply to residential tenancies. The purpose of s 142(2) of the RTA in 
both the original and amended versions was to make it clear that, despite the RTA's attempt to clarify 
and bring together residential tenancies law, the Tribunal is still required to take into account general 
principles of law relevant to leases.37  
This meant that the exoneration provisions could be applied to residential tenancies, which Keane 
J also thought accorded with matters of principle:38 
… in principle there is no essential difference between the forms of tenure that these two statutes govern. 
Both forms of tenure are, to varying degrees, governed by the same general principles of law. The liability 
risk that lessees face under that form of tenure, and that faced by tenants under that cognate form of tenure, 
is essentially indistinguishable. If one is to be immune from suit, so too in logic and equity, and to the 
same extent, should the other. 
D Court of Appeal  
The Court of Appeal agreed with Keane J's conclusion, but for different reasons. It observed that 
although ss 85(2) and 142(2) require the Tribunal to apply general principles of the law of leases in 
resolving disputes,39 there is a tension between this and s 141(1), which excludes the application of 
the PLA.40 But given that s 142(2) requires Tribunal adjudicators to apply "general principles" of the 
law of leases,41 the exoneration provisions were actually "very good, if not the best candidates" for 
being the general principles identified in s 142(2).42 
The Court of Appeal also examined legislative history, particularly the Law Commission's work 
on a new Property Law Act, which clearly supported the exoneration provisions' application to 
residential tenants.43 The Court also identified evidence from Hansard that indicated that the Law 
Commission's recommendations were being given effect to by Parliament.44 However, the fact that 
  
36  At [48].  
37  At [48]. 
38  At [50]. 
39  At [22].  
40  At [23]. 
41  At [24]. 
42  At [30]. 
43  At [36]–[41] and [46]. 
44  At [49]–[54]. 
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Parliament generally intended to give effect to the Law Commission's recommendations cannot show 
that this intention existed for each particular recommendation if the relevant statutory language 
suggests otherwise. Further, Grinlinton reads the parliamentary evidence as showing that "the 
measures were intended to apply to commercial leases only".45  
Despite these and other objections to such an interpretation,46 ultimately the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the exoneration provisions applied to residential tenancies.47 Although the Court had 
noted the question of whether the Tribunal has a discretion to apply the exoneration provisions, or 
whether it must do so in relevant cases,48 in its conclusion and decision it is ambiguous: it speaks both 
of the Tribunal being "entitled" to apply the provisions and that it "may" do so, but also of tenants 
being (seemingly automatically) immune from a claim where the exoneration provisions apply.49  
Ultimately, whether or not one finds the interpretive reasons offered by the courts for the PLA 
exoneration provisions to apply to RTA tenancies, the reasoning provided is complex and can hardly 
be seen as something that tenants and landlords could have understood as determining their rights and 
obligations. This is the first major problem revealed by Holler v Osaki: the lack of clarity in parts of 
the RTA.  
IV THE PROBLEM OF THE LACK OF CLARITY IN THE RTA 
A The Goal of Clarity for Self-Application  
This part identifies important areas of imprecision in the RTA. This lack of clarity is contrary to 
one of the stated goals of the RTA: to simplify the law relating to residential tenancies, in part by 
bringing together the main rules in one Act.50 It is a partial codification of the rights and obligations 
of tenants and landlords; as the Minister of Housing, Phil Goff, stated at the time it was enacted, the 
legislation "clearly defines the rights and responsibilities both of landlords and of tenants", and 
constituted an attempt to bring "all law relating to landlords and tenants into one statute".51 Any 
waiver of tenant rights or powers being of no effect.52  
  
45  Grinlinton, above n 4, at 6 citing (14 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6461 and the introductory notes to the 
Property Law Reform Bill 2006 (89-1) at 79. See generally Grinlinton, above n 5, at 643–644; and Tsai, above 
n 6, at 22–26. 
46  See Grinlinton, above n 5, at 639–644. 
47  At [57]–[58]. 
48  At [32]. 
49  At [57]–[58]. 
50  Residential Tenancies Act, long title; and Grinlinton, above n 20, at 3–5. 
51  (19 September 1985) 466 NZPD 6896–6897. 
52  Residential Tenancies Act, s 11(3).  
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This codification was a welcome development, as it helps landlords and tenants to know the rules 
that govern their relationship. In a lecture examining "Statutes and the Ordinary Person", Professor 
John Burrows observed: "It would be good if ordinary members of the community could consult the 
law that affects them, and understand it".53 This is especially so where statutes involve rights and 
duties that people will "self-apply" to their own actions; in such cases, the law should be 
comprehensible to anyone.54 One of Professor Burrows' examples was the RTA,55 and it is indeed a 
very good example:56   
… rental housing regulation applies to most people at some time during the course of their lives and some 
people may never live outside of its scope. Access to shelter and a home is one of the most important of 
our interests, and the payment for this is one of our greatest economic expenses. … Self-application is 
also likely: it seems safe to assume that most tenants – and probably also many landlords – do not seek 
professional legal advice before signing tenancy agreements. Furthermore, the involvement of lawyers or 
advocates in the Tenancy Tribunal is generally prohibited (subject to specified exceptions), which, 
combined with the low value of such disputes, means that lawyers are generally not involved and that 
consequently there are few experts in this law. Yet people usually do know that there is an important legal 
relationship between landlord and tenant, and that in cases of dispute the exact nature of their rights and 
obligations is important. Thus, if there is a statute that should be clear enough for most ordinary people to 
understand, it is the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 … 
In addition, the aspiration for layperson application of the law is reflected in the fact that the 
adjudicators tasked with applying the law are not required to be legally qualified,57 though they 
usually are. The point is that residential tenancy law is particularly for laypersons, and therefore 
should be as clear, coherent and "codified" (brought together in one place) as possible.  
The RTA achieves this goal only partially. The Act does bring together most of the rights and 
obligations of landlords and tenants in one place and in relatively comprehensible language. There 
are exceptions to this, for example the provisions that regulate the minimum standards of housing 
quality and condition found in s 45,58 although the latest developments in this area (insulation and 
smoke alarms) are admirably clear.59 However, major problems remain in the RTA's clarity.  
  
53  John Burrows "Statutes and the Ordinary Person" (2003) 11 Wai L Rev 1 at 1. 
54  At 1–5. 
55  At 2. 
56  Bierre, Bennett and Howden-Chapman, above n 7, at 153–154 (footnotes omitted). 
57  Residential Tenancies Act, s 67(5)(b). 
58  See generally Bierre, Bennett and Howden-Chapman, above n 7. 
59  Residential Tenancies Amendment Act 2016, ss 43–44, inserting ss 138A–138B into the Residential 
Tenancies Act. 
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B The Interaction with the PLA under s 142 
As has been shown above, s 142 is not clear in identifying how the RTA's rules relate to the law 
of leases contained in the PLA. The exclusion provision, s 142(1) reflects the RTA's status as a special 
"codified" regime for residential tenancies by stating that the PLA's rules concerning the law of leases 
do not apply.  
Prior to 2007, this would have been the end of the legal argument: the PLA does not apply. 
However, s 142(2) of the RTA was amended in 2007 at the time the new PLA was enacted, creating 
the general principles discretion. It is not clear how this can be applied coherently with s 142(1). As 
stated in the Tenancy Tribunal order in Osaki v Holler: "Section 142 presents at first blush as 
paradoxical, if not starkly contradictory, in the direction it provides to the tribunal."60 
To give a meaning and application to s 142(2), it is necessary to identify the general principles 
that might be sourced from pt 4 of the PLA. However, the Court of Appeal observed, "none of the 
provisions in that part can easily be categorised" as general principles.61 This was part of its reason 
for saying that the exoneration provisions are the best candidates to be general principles – otherwise 
s 142(2) would serve no purpose. 
However, Grinlinton has provided clear examples of pt 4 rules that are better examples of "general 
principles", including the implied covenants of quiet enjoyment and non-derogation from grant, rules 
relating to the lessor not giving consent to lessee dealings with the lease and rules relating to non-
renewal and cancellation of leases.62 Many of these provisions, Grinlinton notes, "repeat, and often 
embellish, long-standing 'general principles' of the common law".63 Some of these will have little 
application in the residential tenancy context:64 for example, cancellation of lease rules in the PLA65 
will generally be supplanted by the rules relating to termination of tenancies in the RTA,66 and there 
will be no mortgagee or receiver of a residential tenancy.67 Nevertheless, the point is that there are 
many provisions in pt 4 that could be applied as general principles of the law of leases, so that the 
exoneration provisions need not be forced into that category because there are no other options.  
  
60  At [51].  
61  At [24]. 
62  Grinlinton, above n 4, at 6; and Grinlinton, above n 5, at 642. 
63  Grinlinton, above n 5, at 642. 
64  At 642–643. 
65  Property Law Act, ss 243–264. 
66  Residential Tenancies Act, ss 50–66.  
67  Property Law Act, s 254. 
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Further possibilities are found in the Tenancy Tribunal's own use of s 142(2). In McAllister v 
Saha, the Tribunal used judicial discussions of the meaning of "unreasonably withheld" consent in 
the context of s 226(2) of the PLA for the interpretation of a similar provision of the RTA – s 44.68 In 
Virginian Properties Ltd v James, the adjudicator provided a thorough analysis of s 142(2) and 
identified general principles of the law of leases in both pt 4 of the PLA and in the common law 
relating to whether a former landlord can sue their former tenant after the former landlord had 
transferred the reversion – although the adjudicator preferred to apply the common law principles 
rather than the PLA.69 
Virginian Properties suggests another way of identifying general principles in pt 4, namely if the 
particular statutory rule was a codification of the common law principles of leases pertaining to a 
matter. Then the Tribunal could legitimately say that the rule reflected or confirmed the general 
principles of the law of leases that should be applied to a matter. In contrast, if the rule altered the pre-
existing common law rule, this cannot be seen as a general principle of the law of leases pertaining to 
that matter, as the PLA rule alters those general principles of law. A similar argument on this point is 
made by Grinlinton, who observes that the exoneration provisions:70  
… introduce quite specific reforms to the well-established "general principles of law" that had previously 
applied to tenant liability for damage. It is therefore arguable that … those reforms are in fact the "worst 
candidates" due to their very specific remedial purpose coupled with the clear legislative intention that pt 
4 was not directed at residential tenancies, but rather to reform the law relating to commercial leases.  
If the reply to this is that the new rule itself is a general principle of law, a plausible response would 
be that: (a) this approach is contrary to s 142(2)'s language of "source of the general principles" 
because this would mean there would be no distinction between the provisions of pt 4 and the "general 
principles";71 and (b) this approach nullifies s 142(1) by allowing a court to simply apply the 
provisions of pt 4. 
Whatever one's view on the correct interpretation and result, it is clear that s 142(2) presents 
difficulties of interpretation to the legally-trained, and is incomprehensible to the layperson. From 
both perspectives, the replacement of the original s 142(2) of the RTA by the PLA was ill-conceived. 
The old RTA s 142(1) excluded the operation of the Property Law Act 1952 (PLA 1952) rules 
concerning leases from applying to residential tenancies in the same terms as the current law does, 
but the old s 142(2) was a "savings" provision stating that those PLA 1952 provisions would continue 
  
68  McAllister v Saha TT Tauranga 14/00385/TG, 17 June 2014. See also Thompson v Te Aro Tenancies Ltd TT 
Wellington 14/01671/WN, 10 March 2015. 
69  Virginian Properties Ltd v James TT Porirua 4005816, 4 March 2016. See also McIntosh v Sutcliffe TT 
Wellington 4035646, 7 September 2016. 
70  Grinlinton, above n 5, at 643. See also Grinlinton, above n 4, at 6.  
71  A point also made in Virginian Properties, above n 69, at [21]. 
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to apply to fixed-term or service tenancies that they had applied to immediately before the 
commencement of the RTA, but "subject to the provisions" of the RTA.72 Thus, the new and old 
versions of s 142(2) have completely different effects: the new provision gives us the uncertain 
concept of general principles of the law of leases contained in the PLA being part of the Tribunal's 
decision-making resources for all residential leases. The reasoning for this fundamental change 
provided in the Law Commission's report, as recounted by the Court of Appeal, does not shed any 
light on why the change was desired or the mischief it responded to.73 Section 142 is therefore just as 
unclear in its purpose as it is in its textual meaning. 
Although Grinlinton criticises the Holler v Osaki decisions as having "created confusion and 
uncertainty in the relatively settled law applicable to residential tenancies",74 it seems that this 
confusion and uncertainty was inherent in the law contained in s 142.  
One solution is on the horizon. The problem would be removed by the Residential Tenancies 
Amendment Bill (No 2), which would repeal s 142(2).75 This would allow the Tribunal to continue 
to apply general legal principles of the law of leases that are not inconsistent with the RTA under s 
85. However the mention of the latter section leads to another problem in the clarity of our residential 
tenancy law.  
C The Tribunal's Adjudicative Role under s 85  
Unfortunately, s 142 is not the only confusing provision in the RTA. Section 85(2) states: 
The Tribunal shall determine each dispute according to the general principles of the law relating to the 
matter and the substantial merits and justice of the case, but shall not be bound to give effect to strict legal 
rights or obligations or to legal forms or technicalities. 
To apply this section, the Tribunal must identify "general principles of law" and the "substantial merits 
and justice" of the case, as distinct from "strict legal rights" and "legal forms or technicalities". Such 
an imprecise direction is unwelcome in a statute that is supposed to clarify the rights and obligations 
of landlord and tenant so that they can know them and apply them to their interactions, and which is 
full of precise definitions, special exclusions of its operation, and a myriad of procedural formalities. 
It should be replaced with a section that provides with more precision what adjudicative discretion is 
required or allowed.  
For example, it may be that the provision should simply make clear that strict forms and 
technicalities need not be followed where this would be contrary to the justice of the case, which is a 
  
72  See Holler v Osaki (CA), above n 3, at [42].  
73  At [44]–[45]. 
74  Grinlinton, above n 4, at 7. 
75  Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill (No 2) 2017 (258-1), cl 21. 
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kind of codification of a philosophical concept of equity.76 This was the interpretation given by the 
High Court in Ziki Investments (Properties) Ltd v McDonald, where the Judge stated that s 85 "simply 
means that technical requirements, such as matters of form or time, may not be strictly applied".77 In 
Welsh v Housing New Zealand Ltd78 it was held that a decision based on the substantial merits must 
be in terms of the general rules and principles of the law, rather than being based on underlying moral 
principles unconnected to the law.79 Whether this extends beyond not strictly applying technical 
requirements of time or form is not clear, but this statement of the correct approach was affirmed by 
the District Court and High Court in Holler v Osaki.80   
However, s 85 has also been used in circumstances other than to avoid technicalities of form or 
time limit. For example, it has been used to "pierce the corporate veil" where the landlord companies 
that were liable to the tenant had been wound up.81 It was applied in Holler v Osaki to extend the 
exoneration provisions to the wife of the tenant, when the statute only referred to the tenant.82 As will 
be discussed below, some adjudicators used s 85 to avoid the consequences of Holler v Osaki by 
making the tenants liable for damage in respect of which they should have, strictly legally speaking, 
been exonerated from any liability.  
These might be regarded as good uses of s 85 from a normative perspective, as they allow the 
Tribunal to achieve results that arguably align with the underlying reasons for the rules we have, and 
to achieve justice on the merits of the case. But these uses go beyond the court not strictly applying 
technicalities of form and time, as they involve disregarding the technical position relating to the 
persons who are bound by obligations. Where adjudicators disagree on the role of s 85, they will be 
exercising their discretion in different ways, leading to inconsistency in adjudicative approach.  
Whatever the "best" meaning and purpose of s 85 is, the courts or Parliament should act quickly 
to make clear the meaning and purpose that should be applied. In addition, the question as to whether 
it is legitimate for courts to exercise the same powers under s 85 – when that section only refers to the 
Tribunal having those powers – is another one that should be definitively set out in the RTA.83  
  
76  Roger Shiner "Aristotle's Theory of Equity" (1994) 27 Loy L Rev 1245.  
77  Ziki Investment (Properties) Ltd v McDonald [2008] 3 NZLR 417 (HC) at [69]. See also Virginian Properties, 
above n 69.  
78  Welsh v Housing New Zealand Ltd HC Wellington AP35/2000, 9 March 2001. 
79  See also Molijn v Tanner Group Ltd TT Thames 4021465, 14 June 2016.  
80  Osaki v Holler (DC), above n 30, at [47]–[48] and [51]; and Holler v Osaki (HC), above n 2, at [39]–[40]. 
81  Cross v Walker TT North Shore 4012824, 2 September 2016 at [2]–[4]. 
82  Osaki v Holler (DC), above n 30, at [52]–[53]. 
83  See Grinlinton, above n 4, at 6.  
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V THE PROBLEM OF UNEVEN EFFECT IN THE TENANCY 
TRIBUNAL 
The uncertainties identified above in the RTA's normative framework are enough to warrant 
legislative action to clarify the law. Yet further evidence of the problematic nature of aspects of our 
residential tenancy law and its application is revealed by the way that the Tenancy Tribunal responded 
to the decisions of the courts. The Tribunal is the main forum for the resolution of residential tenancy 
disputes, having original jurisdiction over most such matters,84 and with appeals only being available 
where the dispute has a value over $1,000.85 Tribunals sit around the country in most places that have 
a District Court, and are staffed by around 40 adjudicators, overseen by a Principal Tenancy 
Adjudicator.86 The Ministry of Justice's online database of Tenancy Tribunal orders holds orders 
made in the previous three years. This study conducted a wide-ranging search to examine how the 
Tribunal dealt with the upturning of the law of tenant liability in the Holler v Osaki decisions.   
This study found a problem in the consistency of Tribunal practice. For almost three years after 
the District Court decision, the Tribunal's application of the exoneration provisions was inconsistent, 
with some Tribunals applying the Holler v Osaki decisions as binding precedent, and some not 
applying it at all or distinguishing it. This resulted in different law on liability for careless damage 
being applied in different Tribunals.  
To summarise, initially, the Tribunal seems not to have applied the District Court's ruling that the 
exoneration provisions covered residential tenancies, when it appears to have been bound by the 
doctrine of precedent to do so. After the High Court decision, there was a split between Tribunal 
orders that applied the exoneration provisions to all careless damage claims and those that did not 
apply it to any such claims. Then, after the Principal Tenancy Adjudicator issued a Practice Direction 
interpreting the High Court decision limiting the scope of the exoneration provisions for residential 
tenancies,87 most Tribunal orders either did not refer to Holler v Osaki at all or made a distinction 
between catastrophic events where the exoneration provisions did apply, and other damage to which 
they did not apply; however other Tribunals applied the exoneration provisions in full. It was only 
after the Court of Appeal's decision that uniformity was achieved and the exoneration provisions were 
applied in full to residential tenancies by the Tribunal. For reference, a table summarising the timeline 
of the events discussed in this part is as follows: 
 
  
84  Residential Tenancies Act, s 77. 
85  Section 117. 
86  Ministry of Justice "Tenancy Adjudicators" (7 July 2017) <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
87  Principal Tenancy Adjudicator Practice Direction 1/2014 (2014). 
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Date Event Effect in Tenancy Tribunal 
23 September 2013 
District Court decision 
(applies exoneration 
provisions (EP)) 
No 2013 orders available online; no 
effect before High Court (HC) 
decision  
20 August 2014 HC decision (applies EP) 
Many orders follow HC by applying 
EP completely; a similar number do 
not refer to HC or apply EP; a small 
number distinguish HC 
12 December 2014 
Principal Tenancy 
Adjudicator's 2014 Practice 
Direction (PD) 
Most orders apply as PD interprets the 
HC decision; some orders apply EP 
completely 
15 April 2016 
Court of Appeal's (CA) 
decision 
Orders apply CA decision and apply 
EP completely 
26 July 2016 
Principal Tenancy 
Adjudicator's 2016 Practice 
Note 
Application of CA decision continues 
The uneven effect that is revealed by examining Tribunal practice is a problem from the 
perspectives of the doctrine of precedent and consistency. The District Court decision, and then the 
High Court decision, should have been understood as binding on the Tenancy Tribunal, even if it was 
under appeal. Questions of law decided on by the Tribunal may be appealed to the District Court,88 
and then to the High Court89 and finally to the Court of Appeal.90 This is the precedential hierarchy 
on questions of law. Accordingly, the Tribunal treats higher court decisions on the law as binding.91 
In one Tribunal order, the reasons for the decision stated: "The legal doctrine of stare decisis 
  
88  Residential Tenancies Act, s 117.  
89  Section 119. 
90  Section 120. 
91  See for example Ahuja v Maka TT Manukau 4015915, 13 January 2017; Wakefield v Hodgson TT Whangarei 
4046156, 26 January 2017; Pihama v Yinwen, above n 7; Riddler v Beesley TT Masterton 4032041, 21 
October 2016; Kereopa v Iskandar TT Manukau 4050265, 29 November 2016; Paul v White TT 
14/00096/NU, 17 March 2014; McDonald Real Estate Ltd v Graham TT New Plymouth 14/00368/NU, 8 
August 2014; and Morrison v Portfolio Property Management Ltd TT Wellington 14/00194/WN, 15 April 
2014. 
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(decisions of courts higher in the judicial hierarchy bind lower courts/tribunals) means the Tribunal 
must follow District Court's decisions".92 Another order states:93 
… I am bound, because of the legal principle of binding precedent (stare decisis – all tribunals exercising 
inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction), to apply 
[the High Court decision] to the facts of the present matter. 
In a case that turned on whether a High Court decision was binding on the interpretation of the 
meaning of "residential tenancies", the adjudicator conducted a thorough analysis of the concept of 
precedent, including this statement:94 
The doctrine of precedent requires lower courts and tribunals to follow the judgments of courts above 
them in the same hierarchy, where the subject matter of the judgment is the same, or closely similar to, 
the subject matter of the case to be decided in the lower court or tribunal. Thus the Tenancy Tribunal is 
bound by the judgments of the District Court on appeal from the Tenancy Tribunal. Similarly, the District 
Court is bound by judgments of the High Court, the High Court by judgments of the Court of Appeal and 
the Court of Appeal by judgments of the Supreme Court of New Zealand. 
Further, orders of the Tribunal later treated the High Court and Court of Appeal decisions in Holler 
v Osaki as binding.95 This part shows how this understanding of binding precedent was not effective 
in many Tribunal orders, and how this caused an inconsistency with those Tribunal orders that did 
follow precedent.  
A Effect of the District Court Decision  
Although Judge Mathers' decision in the District Court on 23 September 2013 ruled that the PLA 
exoneration provisions should apply to residential tenancies through s 142(2), this does not seem to 
have been applied by Tenancy Tribunals. As the online database does not extend back into 2013 – the 
orders remaining online for three years – there is no easily accessible evidence to show whether Judge 
Mathers' judgment had any effect during 2013. However, we can presume that the District Court 
decision had little effect and was not applied in the Tribunal, as the orders published in the database 
from January 2014 through to the High Court decision in August do not refer to it in the context of 
careless damage.96  
  
92  Slade v Housing New Zealand TT Auckland 4054447, 23 December 2016 at [8]. 
93  Calquin v Cao TT Auckland 4046613, 19 December 2016 at [14]. 
94  Tan v Arzi TT Manukau 4024444, 4 November 2016 at [34]. 
95  See for example Lenny v Winiata TT Rotorua 15/01001/RO, 29 June 2015; and Rentables Ltd v Henare 
Palmerston North TT 4012938, 28 April 2016. 
96  This is established by keyword searching for "Osaki", and no hits being returned until after the High Court 
decision. For examples of orders on careless damage, see Khan v Morrison TT Palmerston North 
13/01931/PM, 7 February 2014; Seddon v Peacock TT Tauranga 13/01657/TG, 11 February 2014; Wilson v 
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It is not clear why the District Court decision had no effect on the Tribunal's practice, but it may 
be that it was simply not brought to the Tribunal's attention. It is probable that tenants did not know 
of the decision, and parties to tenancy disputes are generally not represented by lawyers.97 If "merits 
and justice" discretion in s 85 was being used to not apply the District Court's decision one would 
expect reasoning to that effect in the order. Instead, Holler v Osaki was not mentioned, which suggests 
that adjudicators simply were not aware of it.  
B Effect of the High Court Decision before the 2014 Practice Direction 
1 Full exoneration 
In contrast, there clearly was an awareness of the High Court decision after it was handed down 
on 20 August 2014, for there was a definite response from the Tenancy Tribunal. A number of 
adjudicators applied Holler v Osaki's reasoning to all kinds of careless tenant damage – whether minor 
or catastrophic – by either exonerating the tenant from liability or refusing to make any order before 
the landlord had provided information about its insurance arrangements.98 Adjudicators often took 
some care to explain why they could no longer award compensation for careless damage caused by 
  
Gould TT Blenheim 14/00019/BM, 13 March 2014; Coates v Wright TT Tauranga 13/01820/TG, 12 March 
2014; Housing New Zealand Corp v Nikora TT Auckland 13/02198/HE, 13 March 2014; Hendriks v Iron 
Bridge Property Management (Auck) Ltd TT Tauranga 14/00231/TA, 18 March 2014; Thorpe v Brown TT 
North Shore 14/00351/TA, 26 March 2014; and Goode Leith Realty Ltd v Lee TT Whangarei 14/00631/WR, 
13 June 2014.  
97  See Residential Tenancies Act, s 93. 
98  Powell v O'Hanlon TT North Shore 14/01074/TA, 23 September 2014; Berriman v Singh TT Manukau 
14/05228/MK, 22 September 2014; Butcher v Horncastle Property Management Ltd TT North Shore 
14/01080/TA, 23 September 2014; Sloss v McKee TT Christchurch 14/02472/CH, 9 October 2014; 
Christchurch City Council v Stevenson TT Christchurch 14/02490/CH, 23 October 2014; Ha v Healey TT 
Christchurch 14/02474/CH, 30 October 2014; Clarke v Wilson TT Auckland 14/01786/HE, 3 November 
2014; Housing New Zealand Corp v Coker TT Porirua 14/00907/PO, 5 November 2014; Charta Management 
Ltd v Murray TT Auckland 14/01753/HE, 7 November 2014; Sheppard v Mosen  TT Auckland 14/01742/HE, 
7 November 2014; The Wong Family Trust v Vahaakoto TT Manukau 14/06690/MK, 10 November 2014; 
Otaki Rentables Ltd Agent for Rikki Jones v Chapman TT Porirua 14/00933/PO, 12 November 2014; Gu v 
Leary TT Christchurch 14/02595/CH, 12 November 2014; Preet & Co Rentals Ltd v Iripa TT Manukau 
14/06669/MK, 12 November 2014; Steven v Tonga TT Tauranga 14/01374/TG, 14 November 2014; K & V 
Properties Ltd v Cowley TT Auckland 14/02064/HE, 18 November 2014; James & Kushla Property Co Ltd 
v Herewini TT Rotorua 14/01358/RO, 19 November 2014; Esquilant v Mana Property Management Ltd TT 
Dunedin 14/00833/DN, 25 November 2014; Brogden v Skidmore TT Christchurch 14/02731/CH, 25 
November 2014; Wongeoon Vast Ltd v Vaitohi TT Christchurch 14/02719/CH, 28 November 2014; Court v 
Star TT North Shore 14/01399/TA, 4 December 2014; Moore v Rowe TT Wellington 14/01384/WN, 5 
December 2014; Pride Property Management Ltd Agent for Rex Beech v Hetaraka TT Invercargill 
14/00648/IN, 8 December 2014; Barbarich v BJN Properties Ltd TT Gisborne 14/00368/GS, 11 December 
2014; and Mitchell v Manu TT Christchurch 14/02634/CH, 12 December 2014. 
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the tenant, by setting out the PLA exoneration provisions and by explaining the effect of the High 
Court's decision. For example, one adjudicator stated that under Holler v Osaki:99 
… the Tribunal has no option but to find that where landlords are insured against the loss claimed, and 
even if the loss was caused by the tenant's negligence, the landlord can no longer recover the loss directly 
from the tenants. Effectively, the tenants are entitled to the benefit of the landlord's insurance.  
In a later decision, the same adjudicator explained that the law relating to the tenant's liability for 
careless or intentional damage:100 
… has now been modified by the recent decision of Holler v Osaki [2014] NZHC 1977. Here the High 
Court held that in exercising its jurisdiction the Tribunal must look to Part 4 of the Property Law Act 2007 
as a source of the general principles of law relating to a matter provided for in that Part. In other words 
residential tenants facing claims under the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 are now entitled to claim the 
same immunity expressly given to commercial tenants under the Property Law Act. … Therefore, in most 
instances when considering whether the tenants can be held liable for repair costs, the Tribunal now 
requires evidence from the landlord on whether or not the landlord is able to benefit from an insurance 
claim for this damage. The [T]ribunal must also consider whether the loss claimed was caused by the 
negligent or intentional actions of the tenant or someone entitled to be on the premises. The distinction is 
new to the Tribunal. 
In another order, the adjudicator explained the application of Holler v Osaki to the landlord claimant, 
Housing New Zealand:101 
General comment on damages claims: I explained to Ms Smith appearing for Housing New Zealand at 
the hearing that a recent High Court decision, Holler & Rouse v Osaki CIV 2013-404-4548, has raised an 
issue relevant to damages claims.  
…  
What this means is that if the premises are damaged by fire, flood, etc, or any other peril against the risk 
of which the landlord is insured (or has agreed to insure) then the landlord cannot require the tenant to 
meet the cost of making good the damage, indemnify the landlord, or pay compensation in respect of the 
damage, even though the damage is caused or contributed to by the negligence of the tenant or anyone 
associated with it. 
  
99  Butcher v Horncastle Property Management Ltd, above n 98 at [9]. The same reasoning is found in Powell v 
O'Hanlon, above n 98.  
100  Tuthill v Croon TT Auckland 14/01937/HE, 18 November 2014 at [3] and [5]. 
101  Housing New Zealand Corp v Coker, above n 98, at [10]–[12]. See also The Wong Family Trust v Vahaakoto, 
above n 98; Otaki Rentables Ltd Agent for Rikki Jones v Chapman, above n 98; and Steven v Tonga, above n 
98.  
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The vast majority of Tribunal orders placed on the database that mention the decision in Holler v 
Osaki between the date of the High Court decision and the date of the Practice Direction apply the 
case as a precedent requiring them to exonerate the tenants of liability, where the PLA provisions 
would have exonerated a commercial tenant. In addition, some adjudicators applied reasoning 
congruent with Holler v Osaki without citing it.102 Some orders concerned fire damage, and as the 
issue was not discussed, it is not clear whether a wider or narrower view of Holler v Osaki was being 
taken.103 
2 Partial exoneration  
However, the application of Holler v Osaki in Tribunal orders was not uniform. That adjudicators 
were uneasy with the change in Tribunal practice forced by the High Court's decision is reflected in 
the way that some adjudicators found that Holler v Osaki did not apply to exonerate the damage 
caused by the tenant. This goes beyond situations where adjudicators simply found that the landlord 
did not have insurance cover for damage caused by the tenant, for this effectively applies the High 
Court's decision.104 Beyond this, adjudicators found it possible to distinguish Holler v Osaki: one 
adjudicator used the discretion given by ss 142 and 85 to make the tenant liable for their careless 
damage to the landlord's property despite the landlord being insured.105 This was based on a 
distinction in the type of event and damage:106 
It is debatable whether that High Court decision intended that this general principle is to apply regardless 
of the degree of damage or to damage other than fire damage.  
…  
The situation discussed in the High Court decision differs substantially from the damages claims in these 
applications. The damage was a significant one-off event with a very dramatic and expensive 
consequence. The facts are too different to those in the current applications for me to ignore Section 142(1) 
that says nothing in the Property Law Act 2007 shall apply. Therefore I find that the High Court decision 
does not apply to the damage claims in these applications. 
  
102  RER Property Management v Morgan TT Manukau 14/05412/MK, 12 September 2014; and Alexey Trust Ltd 
v Chapman TT Auckland 14/01429/HE, 16 September 2014. 
103  Optimize Realty Ltd v Ward TT 14/01039/WR, 26 September 2014; and Barbarich v BJN Properties Ltd, 
above n 98. 
104  Charta Management Ltd v Murray, above n 98; and Gu v Leary, above n 98. 
105  Robinson v Telfer TT Auckland 14/01765/AK, 5 December 2014. 
106  At 12. 
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This reasoning was applied by this adjudicator in other orders.107 Interestingly, this reading of Holler 
v Osaki as limited to fire damage or dramatic, one-off, expensive events – which we may term 
"catastrophic damage" – was later to be taken up by the Principal Tenancy Adjudicator's Practice 
Direction, discussed below.  
Another approach was to say that the application of principles of law found in pt 4 of the PLA 
was discretionary, and should not be applied where this was contrary to the merits of the dispute. 
Thus, an adjudicator stated that s 142(2) merely provides a discretion to adjudicators, which allowed 
the adjudicator to remedy a claim for the excess paid by a landlord to their insurer:108  
… s 142(2) provides that the Tribunal, "in exercising its jurisdiction in accordance with s 85" of the RTA, 
"may" look at those sections "as a source of … general principles of law" relating to leases covered by the 
PLA. Therefore reference to ss 268 to 270 PLA is discretionary.  
The adjudicator also thought that it was necessary for policy reasons to make a distinction between 
the exoneration of liability (a) for the damage to the landlord's property and (b) to compensate the 
landlord's loss in having to pay their insurance excess:109 
… if the decision in Osaki were to be extended to the excess, or to cases where the amount claimed is 
below the level of the excess, in a large number of cases the landlord would not be able to bring a claim 
against the tenant. That is because most rental properties are likely to be insured, and careless damage is 
likely to be covered by most insurance policies. The practical effect would [be] to create a significantly 
different outcome for a landlord, depending on whether damage was careless or intentional. It would also 
create the perverse effect of the landlord being disadvantaged by having insurance in cases of minor 
careless damage. 
Fulfilling the adjudicative role under s 85, the adjudicator declined to relieve the tenant from liability 
for compensating the landlord's loss relating to their excess.  
3 Continuing tenant liability without mentioning Holler v Osaki 
In addition to these decisions that "distinguished" Holler v Osaki or used s 85 to make the tenant 
liable, other cases simply continued the Tribunal's previous practice with respect to liability for 
careless damage. This occurred in almost as many orders as the application of the exoneration 
provisions. Indeed, in these orders, Holler v Osaki was not referred to at all, and so there was no 
analysis of whether the tenant should be exonerated from liability – or of the subsidiary questions of 
  
107  Robinson v Telfer, above n 105. See also Ballantine v Sproule TT Tauranga 14/01454/TG, 10 December 2014; 
and A & B Homes v Garnel TT 14/01421/TG, 10 December 2014. This reasoning was also applied later in 
Van Vliet v Russell Hardie Ltd TT Rotorua 15/01672/RO, 28 October 2015.  
108  Purple Phoenix Ltd v Harrison TT Tauranga 14/01329/TG, 26 November 2014 at [5(b)]. See also Ballantine 
v Sproule, above n 107; and A & B Homes Ltd v Garnel, above n 107. 
109  Purple Phoenix Ltd v Harrison, above n 108, at [5(c)]. 
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whether the tenant's actions were careless rather than intentional or whether the landlord had a relevant 
insurance policy.110 Because it is simply not mentioned, it is not clear whether adjudicators in these 
cases were unaware of Holler v Osaki, or did not address it because it was not mentioned by the tenant, 
or thought that the decision did not apply to situations where the damage was not caused by 
catastrophic events.  
What is clear is that there were three main responses to the High Court's decision in Holler v 
Osaki. Many orders applied all of the PLA exoneration provisions to all kinds of careless damage. A 
similar number of orders did not apply the exoneration provisions to careless damage claims, but 
without mentioning Holler v Osaki. And a small minority of orders distinguished the reasoning in 
Holler v Osaki from the damages claim they were dealing with. This shows that there was a clear split 
in the Tribunal, with different legal rules being applied by adjudicators to the same legal question. 
This split does not necessarily reflect any problem for the doctrine of precedent, for it may be that 
those who did not mention Holler v Osaki were unaware of the decision or were among those who 
distinguished it. However, it still demonstrates a concerning inconsistency in Tribunal practice.  
C Principal Tenancy Adjudicator's 2014 Practice Direction 
Perhaps responding to this inconsistency in the Tribunal's application of the law, on 12 December 
2014, three and a half months after the High Court's decision in Holler v Osaki, the Principal Tenancy 
Adjudicator issued a Practice Direction in response to the decision, pursuant to her power under s 115 
of the RTA.111   
The Practice Direction stated that the High Court's decision meant that where a property subject 
to a residential tenancy suffers damage due to a fire caused by the carelessness of a tenant or his or 
her agent, the tenant is entitled to claim immunity against an application to the Tenancy Tribunal by 
  
110  City Apartments Ltd v Young TT Auckland 14/02335/AK, 22 August 2014; McLeod v Ryland TT Christchurch 
14/02094/CH, 2 September 2014; Pert v Barton TT Auckland 14/01284/HE, 2 September 2014; Dolgova v 
Gandhimani TT Auckland 14/02475/AK, 10 September 2014; SJC Properties Ltd v Hunapo TT Hamilton 
14/01322/HN, 19 September 2014; Ingram v Singh TT Hamilton 14/01923/HN, 20 September 2014; Kelly v 
Budomo TT Auckland 14/02633/AK, 30 September 2014; Inspire Property Management Ltd v Conroy TT 
Manukau 14/06225/MK, 8 October 2014; Kram v Porter-Pomare TT Auckland 14/03017/AK, 8 October 
2014; Thielke v Gibbon TT Auckland 14/02514/AK, 9 October 2014; Ray White Kerikeri v Dwight TT 
Whangeri 14/00934/WR, 21 October 2014; Sharma v Orakawa Holdings Ltd TT Auckland 14/02854/AK, 22 
October 2014; Te Paea v Allen Realty Ltd TT Manukau 14/06428/MK, 28 October 2014; Zhao v Tana TT 
Manukau 14/06332/MK, 29 October 2014; The Packingshed Cafe Ltd v Rowe TT Christchurch 14/01758/CH, 
29 October 2014; Morriss v Morgan TT Manukau 14/06468/MK, 7 November 2014; Creak v Wright TT 
Auckland 14/02447/AK, 12 November 2014; Lewis v McEvoy TT Manukau 14/06647/MK, 19 November 
2014; Situ v Feiloakitau TT Auckland 14/03306/AK, 27 November 2014; and Waitakere Real Estate Ltd v 
Tangiiau TT Auckland 14/00664/HE, 4 December 2014. 
111  Principal Tenancy Adjudicator, above n 87. 
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the landlord for damages or compensation.112 However, it limited the application of the exoneration 
provisions to only the "catastrophic event[s] found in s 268(1)(a) of the PLA07".113 Outside of those 
catastrophic events, a tenant is still liable for carelessly damaging the property in breach of ss 40 or 
41 of the RTA, and the Tribunal "will apply its current jurisprudence".114 The Direction also stated 
that even if the tenant is exonerated from liability in regards to the catastrophic event, the landlord 
may make a claim for the excess.115 Thus the Practice Direction identified a more limited legal rule 
than in the District and High Courts' decisions: it distinguished between careless damage caused by 
fire, and damage caused otherwise by tenants' carelessness.  
Although the Direction brought the High Court decision to adjudicators' attention and stated a 
reasonable rule for tenant liability for careless damage that would cause the minimum of disruption 
to the Tribunal's prior practice, the legal basis for this distinction was not explained, and it is not 
obvious. Such a distinction between catastrophic events and non-catastrophic damage is not found in 
the exoneration provisions themselves. Nor is it found in the High Court summary judgment 
decision,116 or in the District Court decision.117 It is also not evident in the High Court's reasoning, 
which did not turn on the specific cause of damage, whether fire or catastrophic events generally.118 
Keane J held that "tenants holding residential tenancies facing claims under the RTA are entitled to 
claim the immunity that the PLA accords to lessees generally".119 His view was that the exoneration 
provisions should apply to residential tenancies under s 142 of the RTA.120 The Judge's legal 
conclusion is stated in general terms without making the distinctions found in the Practice 
Direction.121 
Given that the question of the type of damage does not seem material to Keane J's reasoning and 
decision, a plausible interpretation of the effect of the District and High Court's decisions is that the 
exoneration provisions as a whole were to be applied to all questions of liability for damage to which 
they would apply if they were not excluded from applying to residential tenancies. This interpretation 
  
112  At [1]. 
113  At [3]. 
114  At [4].  
115  At [2]. 
116  Holler v Osaki (summary judgment), above n 26. 
117  At [55]–[58], speaking generally of the applicability of ss 268–269 of the Property Law Act. 
118  Holler v Osaki (HC), above n 2, [29]–[30] and [48]. 
119  At [49]. 
120  At [29]–[30] and [48]. 
121  At [29]–[30]. 
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is at least arguable, as the Tenancy Tribunal orders that subsequently applied such an interpretation 
confirm.  
In addition, the more general view of the law found in the District and High Court decisions is 
also reflected by the questions stated by the appellants in the appeal application, which did not make 
such a distinction.122 This question was stated by the High Court on 21 October 2014, two months 
after the substantive decision but before the Practice Direction was issued. The relevant question was 
"[w]hether residential tenants are immune from a claim by the landlord where the rental property 
suffers loss or damage caused intentionally or carelessly by the tenant or the tenant's guests?"123 
Keane J accepted this statement of the issue, but added this observation:124  
The questions of law to which my decision gives rise might conceivably be expressed more narrowly than 
the appellants propose. In my decision, for instance, the questions I identified were these, "In imposing 
liability on tenants for fire damage, does the RTA incorporate by reference ss 268 and 269 of the PLA, 
insofar as they exonerate tenants from liability? Or does it deny them any operative effect?" But because 
my own questions are worthy of a second appeal and necessarily arise on the questions proposed, any 
refinement of those proposed is to be resolved on the appeal itself. 
The Court of Appeal characterised the question in its wider ambit, saying that the case turned on 
whether ss 268–269 of the PLA apply to residential tenancies.125  
However, there is one key point in the High Court's decision where such a distinction is suggested: 
where the Judge states the issue to be decided in the case:126   
The issue on this appeal involves, therefore, the extent to which the PLA, Part 4 of which governs leases 
generally, applies to residential tenancies, a form of tenure created and governed by the RTA. More 
particularly, as it relates to Mr Osaki, it involves two questions. In imposing liability on tenants for fire 
damage, does the RTA incorporate by reference ss 268 and 269 of the PLA, insofar as they exonerate 
tenants from liability? Or does it deny them any operative effect?  
Although the first statement of the issue indicates the general question that determined the result, the 
second issue statement seems to limit the question that is being determined in the case to tenant 
liability for fire damage. This might be a reason for a limited interpretation of the binding reasons 
from the High Court decision. And as noted above, this was perhaps the only way that the Principal 
  
122  Holler v Osaki (CA), above n 3, Statement of Questions.  
123  The reference to intentional must be incorrect, as tenants are never exonerated from liability for intentional 
damage under the Property Law Act provisions. 
124  Holler v Osaki [2014] NZHC 2470 at [4].  
125  At [1]. 
126  Holler v Osaki (HC), above n 2, at [7]. 
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Tenancy Adjudicator could interpret the High Court's decision as not meaning that most of the 
Tribunal's orders in relation to careless damage since 2007 incorrectly failed to exonerate tenants – 
and that the Tribunal must therefore completely change its practice of holding tenants liable for 
careless damage. This pragmatic concern does not mean the Practice Direction was the best 
interpretation of the High Court's decision, but it is an obvious reason for taking the narrower approach 
to exonerating liability.   
D Effect of the 2014 Practice Direction 
Examining orders relating to careless damage after it was made reveals that despite the Practice 
Direction, the split observed in Tribunal practice after the High Court decision continued through 
2015 and 2016, until the Court of Appeal's decision. There was, however, a change in the numbers of 
adjudicators taking each position, with many more orders giving effect to the Practice Direction than 
the wider interpretation of the High Court's decision.  
1 Partial exoneration – applying the Practice Direction  
The Practice Direction had an immediate effect, leading adjudicators to apply the Practice 
Direction's interpretation of the law and to distinguish between careless damage generally and 
catastrophic damage in applying the exoneration provisions. Just three days later, on 15 December 
2014, an adjudicator observed:127 
Damages claims generally: I mentioned at the end of the hearing that there has been a High Court 
decision of Holler & Rouse v Osaki which may have a bearing on this case. However, a practice direction 
issued by the Principal Tenancy Adjudicator on 12 December 2014 has clarified the Tribunal 's position 
as to the application of the High Court decision. In this case, the landlords' claims for careless damage 
caused by the tenants is within sections 40 and 41 of the Act, and therefore the Tribunal will apply its 
current jurisprudence.  
In another early application of the Practice Direction, the adjudicator stated that:128 
… my preliminary view of the effect of the High Court's decision [in Holler v Osaki] was that this decision 
(and Ms Quinton's insurance cover) could well operate to provide Ms Hampton with an immunity on 
account of the provisions of sections 268-269 of the Property Law Act 2007. However, after giving the 
matter some further consideration and after taking into account the recent Practice Direction issued by the 
Principal Tenancy Adjudicator on the issue, I find that the Osaki decision is distinguishable on the facts 
of the present dispute … For this reason no immunity under sections 268-269 arises …  
The reason it is distinguishable is not given.  
  
127  Brophy v Taylor TT Wellington 14/01461/WN, 15 December 2014 at [14] (citations omitted). See also 
Brickland v Gage TT Rotorua 14/01920/RO, 15 January 2015. 
128  Hampton v Quinton TT Auckland 14/01895/AK, 30 January 2015 at [13].  
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In addition, other adjudicators distinguished the High Court decision in Holler v Osaki by 
reference to the nature of the damage without mentioning the Practice Direction.129 Where the damage 
was catastrophic, some adjudicators applied the exoneration provisions, but usually with reasoning 
that seemed to limit their application to catastrophic events;130 other cases were more ambiguous as 
to whether they would limit the application to such catastrophic events.131  
In other orders, the adjudicators noted that Holler v Osaki was under appeal.132 This led one 
adjudicator to adjourn the case:133 
The urgency point is tied to the uncertain legal position as a result of the decision of the High Court in 
Holler & Rouse v Osaki. The High Court's decision is presently under appeal to the Court of Appeal, and 
it is preferable for the Tribunal to await the decision of the Court of Appeal before making its own decision 
in the present case. 
As this case was about damage caused by a fire, it seems that the adjudicator may have been cognisant 
that the Court of Appeal might have held that the exoneration provisions did not apply to residential 
tenancies at all, which would have meant that the tenants were liable for the damage they caused.  
2 Continuing tenant liability?  
Just as before the Practice Direction, a large number of decisions simply awarded damages for 
non-catastrophic careless damage to property without referring to Holler v Osaki or the exoneration 
provisions at all.134 However it is likely that these decisions were also applying the Practice Direction 
  
129  Yuan v Maharaj TT Auckland 14/03238/AK, 2 February 2015; Property Brokers Ltd - Manawatu & 
Wanganui v Roy TT Palmerston North 15/00567/PM, 5 June 2015; Croft v Gill TT Palmerston North 
15/00385/PM, 6 July 2015; McLean v Williams Dunedin TT 15/00419/DN, 14 July 2015; Liddell v Kaa TT 
Hamilton 15/01232/HN, 18 August 2015; O'Connor v Kerr TT Dunedin 15/00511/DN, 22 September 2015; 
and Donaldson v Karana TT Pukekohe 15/07001/MK, 3 March 2016. 
130  Morriss v Sonntag TT Dunedin 14/00924/DN, 10 February 2015; Panapa v Morrison TT Hamilton 
14/02024/HN, 17 February 2015; Housing New Zealand v Te Whau TT Rotorua 14/02360/RO, 20 May 2015; 
and Harris v Fergusson TT Christchurch 14/02969/CH, 4 May 2015. 
131  Severinsen v Kava TT Hastings 14/01267/NA, 15 December 2014; Lenny v Winiata, above n 95; and Ruiz v 
Lisa Petch Family Trust TT Tauranga 4002012, 3 February 2016. 
132  Chalmers v Webb TT Christchurch 14/02618/CH, 23 December 2014; and Low v Champagne Homes Ltd TT 
Christchurch 14/02769/CH, 23 January 2015. 
133  Housing New Zealand Corp v Foliaki TT Wellington 14/01367/WN, 12 February 2015 at 2. 
134  Pederson v McDowell TT Auckland 14/03706/AK, 8 January 2015; Scurfield v Staunton TT Manukau 
14/07796/MK, 16 January 2015; Stevenson v Law TT New Plymouth 14/00602/NU, 16 January 2015; Harvic 
Residential Property Management Ltd v Pearce TT Wellington 14/01589/WN, 16 January 2015; Wellington 
City Council - City Housing v Perez TT Wellington 14/01598/WN, 16 January 2015; Lloyd v Wait TT 
Christchurch 14/03004/CH, 13 February 2015; Kumar v Taotua TT Auckland 15/00310/MK, 16 February 
2015; Collins v Scott TT Christchurch 15/00033/CH, 26 February 2015; Dodunski v Nelson TT Hastings 
15/00047/NA, 11 November 2015; Quinovic Property Management Ltd v Dijkstra TT Christchurch 
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without referring to it or Holler v Osaki, because the previous practice of the Tribunal was applicable 
to non-catastrophic damage.  
3 Full exoneration – not applying the Practice Direction  
Although the bulk of orders seemed to apply the Practice Direction,135 even if implicitly, there 
were still a small number of orders that applied the wider view of the High Court decision – that the 
exoneration provisions apply to all carelessly caused damage, not just catastrophic damage. These 
orders, made contrary to the Practice Direction, demonstrate some of the uncertainty about the binding 
effect of such Directions. For they may have reflected the adjudicators' view that the wider 
interpretation of the High Court's decision was correct, and that they should therefore apply the law 
rather than the Practice Direction. It seems unlikely that the adjudicators would be unaware of the 
Direction.  
Therefore, the question of whether practice directions are binding is another uncertainty in the 
RTA. Such practice directions are issued for "the purpose of ensuring that the application and 
administration of this Act is consistent throughout New Zealand".136 They provide for the "guidance 
of other Tenancy Adjudicators, officers of the Tribunal, and parties before the Tribunal".137 Professor 
Grinlinton's text cites a District Court decision stating that such directions are not binding.138  
On one hand, this seems contrary to the intention of s 115 of the RTA in the present context: on 
such a crucial and binary question of the applicability of the exoneration provisions, adjudicators 
should apply the same legal test. On the other hand, it is not clear that s 115 provides the Principal 
Tenancy Adjudicator the power to give binding interpretations of the RTA, and if it does not then 
  
15/00476/CH, 17 March 2015; Hill v Bedford TT Blenheim 15/00002/BM, 18 March 2015; Goode Leith 
Realty Ltd T/A Ray White - Allens v Do TT Whangarei 15/00264/WR, 30 April 2015; Perry v Sinclair TT 
Tauranga 15/00314/TG, 22 April 2015; Crockers Property Management Ltd v Karanga TT Manakau 
15/01082/MK, 25 May 2015; For Homes (NZ) Ltd v Trow TT Palmerston North 15/00685/PM, 4 June 2015; 
Firth v Jager TT North Shore 15/00798/TA, 25 August 2015; Pinchin v Hassan TT Christchurch 
15/00750/CH, 26 August 2015; Forsyth v Ferrari TT Christchurch 15/01743/CH, 14 September 2015; 
Kamota v MacFarlane TT 15/01735/CH, 17 September 2015; Murphy v Larsen TT Tauranga 15/01079/TG, 
23 September 2015; Peacock v PPM Rentals TT Palmerston North 15/01193/PM, 8 October 2015; Sparks v 
Taylor TT Greymouth 15/00063/GM, 22 October 2015; Horncastle Property Management Ltd v Hall TT 
Christchurch 15/02254/CH, 3 November 2015; Rennell v Lill TT Christchurch 15/02229/CH, 1 December 
2015; and Moate v Reid TT Invercargill 15/00534/IN, 22 February 2016. 
135  Payne v Oliver TT Tauranga 14/01371/TG, 14 January 2015; Iron Bridge Property Management Ltd v 
Gallacher TT Manukau 14/07483/MK, 3 February 2015; Thompson v Te Aro Tenancies Ltd TT Wellington 
14/01671/WN, 10 March 2015; Van Vliet v Russell Hardie Ltd TT Rotorua 15/01672/RO, 28 October 2015; 
and Champagne Homes Ltd v Jose TT Christchurch 4015765, 21 April 2016. 
136  Residential Tenancies Act, s 115. 
137  Section 115. 
138  Grinlinton, above n 20, at 266, citing Morton v Murdoch DC Dunedin TT765/96, 18 November 1996.  
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adjudicators should give effect to their understanding of the law in cases where it conflicts with a 
Practice Direction. The two decisions cited above applying the Practice Direction's partial exoneration 
approach reveal some uncertainty as to whether the Practice Direction is binding. The first adjudicator 
presenting it as stating how the Tribunal should apply Holler v Osaki, and the second adjudicator 
saying that the Practice Direction was merely "taken into account".  
This is a further uncertainty in the RTA that should be remedied. It may be that the ability for a 
Tribunal to state a case for the opinion of the High Court under s 103 of the RTA should be used by 
the Principal Tenancy Adjudicator in cases where a difficult question of law has arisen, which would 
allow a binding precedent to be created.  
E The Effect of the Court of Appeal's Decision 
As we have seen, the Court of Appeal did clarify the legal position, in a decision given on 15 April 
2016. Its interpretation of the law, which made no distinction between types of damage and simply 
stated that the exoneration provisions were to apply to residential tenancies in full, was applied by an 
adjudicator on 24 April 2016.139 It was applied consistently after this,140 although there was at least 
one early exception.141 Tribunal adjudicators sometimes explicitly referred to their being bound to 
apply the Court of Appeal's decision.142  
On 26 July 2016, the Principal Tenancy Adjudicator published a Practice Note giving effect to the 
Court's decision.143 It recognised that the PLA exoneration provisions were accordingly to be applied 
in full and gave detailed guidance on how to apply the Court of Appeal's decision, including a 
statement that excess could not be claimed. This provided landlords and tenants with confirmation of 
  
139  Brazier Property Investments Ltd v Penitani TT Christchurch 4015815, 21 April 2016. 
140  Deane v Te Rore TT Blenheim 4018863, 2 May 2016; Reeve v Blomquist TT Christchurch 4015492, 3 May 
2016; Kim v Peterson TT North Shore 4011310, 5 May 2016; Downey v Kidd TT Nelson 4022208, 11 May 
2016; Polglase v Clemments TT Nelson 4019799, 12 May 2016; Hamilton Family Trust v Hockey TT Nelson 
4017185, 12 May 2016; Bayleys Property Services Ltd v Pinkerton TT Waitakere 4050011, 9 January 2017; 
and Taylor Property Management v Hopoate TT Manakau 4055451, 31 January 2017. There are almost 700 
references to the case between May 2016 and March 2017. In Candy v van der Westhuizen TT Manukau 
4021186, 19 October 2016 the adjudicator refers only to the High Court decision. 
141  O'Reilly-Nugent v Stobie-Ross TT Hastings 4011979, 28 April 2016. 
142  Strickland v Sarkar TT Huntly 4050731, 27 January 2017; Dryland v McTainsh TT Hamilton 4055936, 19 
December 2016; Gralin Property Management Ltd v Thomas TT Auckland 4048550, 16 December 2016; and 
Elkington v Mayston TT Hamilton 4047025, 12 December 2016. 
143  Tenancy Tribunal Practice Note 2016/1: Tenant Liability for Damages (2016). 
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the Court of Appeal's decision and explained its implications. Some Tribunal orders referred solely to 
the Practice Note.144 The legal position was also widely reported in the media.145 
There have been decisions that limit Holler v Osaki's impact. For example, s 42(6) of the RTA 
provides for tenant liability for remedying damage caused by removing fixtures, and an adjudicator 
held that this specific provision for remedy excluded the operation of the PLA's exoneration 
provisions.146 Where damage was caused by pets, this was regarded as intentional if it was the 
inevitable consequence of having the pet inside.147 Pet damage is also sometimes an exclusion under 
the landlord's insurance policy, which would prevent the exoneration provisions from applying.148 
Despite this, in one case where damage by a landlord's own pet was insured for, but not damage by 
their tenants' pets, the adjudicator characterised this as inadequate cover rather than lack of 
insurance.149 Tenants are still liable for not leaving the property reasonably clean. Other cases have 
noted that the landlord's insurance policy might not protect against the particular peril that caused the 
damage.150 However, claims that the landlord is not insured because they have to pay an excess have 
not been allowed.151 
The effect of the Court of Appeal's decision was also the subject of a letter sent from the Principal 
Tenancy Adjudicator to the Minister of Building and Housing on 23 September 2016.152 It provides 
a strong argument in favour of a legislative fix for the legal situation resulting from the Court of 
Appeal's decision. She notes that, although there might be good reasons for exonerating tenant liability 
for major damage as found in the Holler v Osaki facts, no distinction on this basis was drawn by the 
Court of Appeal. This means that for the "kind of damage that is the core business of the Tribunal on 
a daily basis throughout the country" the Tribunal "can no longer award damages against a tenant for 
  
144  Shrivastava v Pickled Parrot Property Management Ltd TT Wellington 4051626, 23 November 2016. 
145  See for example "Rental property damage: Landlords liable - court rules" The New Zealand Herald (online 
ed, Auckland, 21 April 2016). 
146  Eves Realty Ltd v Bentley TT Tauranga 4050136, 4 January 2017. 
147  Lewis v Dawson TT Christchurch 4027937, 21 July 2016; Quinovic Property Management t/a Whitby 
Property Management Ltd v Walton TT Porirua 4049667, 28 November 2016; Burtshaw Investments Ltd v 
Buck TT Palmerston North 4051915, 10 January 2017; and Gibbs v McAtear TT Queenstown 4056345, 26 
January 2017. See also Tekoa Trust v Stewart [2016] NZDC 25578; and Thomas Gibbons "Residential 
Tenancies after Holler v Osaki" (2017) 17 Conveyancing Bulletin 401. 
148  Morris v Woodhouse TT Lower Hutt 4037038, 11 August 2016. 
149  Clelland v Bester TT Porirua 4020710, 29 July 2016.  
150  Brazier Property Investments Ltd v Penitani [2017] NZDC 1291. 
151  Powell Holdings Ltd v Steele TT Lower Hutt 4008066, 1 June 2016; and Initial Realty Ltd v Davis TT 
Christchurch 4035467, 12 September 2016. 
152  Letter from Melissa Poole to Nick Smith, above n 6. 
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careless damage if the landlord holds insurance for the risk of that particular kind of damage". This is 
understandably presented as a major problem for the Tribunal, hampering its day-to-day functioning 
due to the necessity of addressing the landlord's insurance cover in each application relating to careless 
damage, and resulting in landlords not being awarded compensation for damage that the RTA "clearly 
envisaged the tenant bearing responsibility for".  
The Principal Tenancy Adjudicator's letter also notes a concern for the reputation of the Tribunal 
due to landlord anger about the decision, and their view that tenant liability for minor damage should 
not be exonerated – as well as anecdotal evidence of landlords leaving the industry. Finally, the 
Principal Adjudicator recommends an amendment to s 142 in order to clarify the law and prevent the 
kind of confusion that has resulted from the decision, stating that "[t]he Tribunal now operates daily 
with an unwieldy amalgam of legislation and binding judicial precedent that has effectively fettered 
a core principle" of the RTA.  
The Government has responded to these suggestions – and pressure from landlords – by proposing 
an amendment to the RTA, contained in the Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill (No 2).153 The 
Bill would essentially limit a tenant's liability for damage caused by a careless act or omission to four 
weeks' rent or the insurance excess if the property is insured by the landlord against the damage.154 
This was essentially the proposal that was rejected in 2008,155 but in light of the reasons of policy and 
principle that were canvassed in the Law Commission's reports and in the Holler v Osaki decisions, it 
seems a marked improvement over both the previous and present legal situations. The Bill is in Select 
Committee, which is due to report back on 29 March 2018.   
VI CONCLUSION 
The law relating to residential tenancies should be straightforward enough that people can apply 
it to their situation or prospective tenancy arrangements without confusion or the need to consult a 
lawyer. The saga of the exoneration demonstrates further examples of the lack of clarity that currently 
exists in the RTA, and the problems this causes for achieving consistent application of the law in the 
Tribunal. This article demonstrates that, for a time, completely different legal rules were being applied 
to substantially identical situations in the Tenancy Tribunal, depending on which adjudicator was 
deciding the dispute. The proposed legislative fix for the Holler v Osaki decision is therefore welcome, 
and it seems to balance the substantive justice of the policy question of tenant exoneration in a 
reasonable way. The proposal to do away with s 142(2) is also sensible, but further consideration 
should be given to clarifying the adjudicative direction found in s 85.  
  
153 Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill (No 2) 2017 (258-1). 
154  Clause 7 inserting ss 49A–49E into the Residential Tenancies Act. 
155  Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008 (217-1), cl 26. See Holler v Osaki (CA), above n 3, at 
[55]. 
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Although there have been some other good developments in the law of residential tenancies – for 
example, the requirements for smoke alarms and insulation,156 and the tightening of rules around 
retaliatory eviction157 – it is high time for the enactment of a new Residential Tenancies Act. This 
should occur after an appropriately comprehensive and participatory examination of the issues facing 
renters given the fundamental changes to the socio-economic structures of housing and social 
inequality that have played out over the last 20 years.158 Countries such as Scotland and Ireland have 
undertaken such inquiries and reforms over the last decade,159 and Victoria in Australia is currently 
examining possible reforms to their residential tenancies legislation.160 In addition to any further 
substantive changes that would flow from such an exercise, there should also be a clarification of s 
85 of the RTA, stating clearly what kind of "merits-based" adjudicative discretion exists. Residential 
tenancy law is important for most New Zealanders' day-to-day lives, and it should be fit for purpose 
both in terms of the substantive rights and obligations it contains, and in terms of the clarity of the 
law.  
  
  
156  Residential Tenancies Amendment Act 2016, ss 43–44, inserting ss 138A–138B into the Residential 
Tenancies Act. 
157  Residential Tenancies Amendment Act, ss 16 and 46, making the giving of a retaliatory notice of termination 
an unlawful act for which exemplary damages up to $4,000 may be awarded. 
158  See further analysis in Bierre, Bennett and Howden-Chapman, above n 7; Mark Bennett "Security of Tenure 
for Generation Rent: Irish and Scottish Approaches" (2016) 47 VUWLR 363; Shamubeel Eaqub and Selena 
Eaqub Generation Rent: Rethinking New Zealand's Priorities (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 2015); 
Philippa Howden-Chapman Home Truths: Confronting New Zealand's Housing Crisis (Bridget Williams 
Books, Wellington, 2015); and New Zealand Productivity Commission Inquiry into Housing Affordability 
(2012).  
159  See Bennett, above n 158.  
160  See Victoria Department of Justice and Regulation "Fairer Safer Housing" Engage Victoria 
<https://engage.vic.gov.au>; and Victoria State Government Heading for Home: Residential Tenancies Act 
Review – Options Discussion Paper (2016). The initial reform proposals are set out at Victoria State 
Government "Making renting fair" <www.vic.gov.au>. 
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